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# NEGOTIATING DEMOCRACY

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Transitions  
from Authoritarian Rule

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four different regions of the world—Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Southern and East Central Europe. In doing so, we also took particular care that each region was represented by cases which had successfully installed democracy, as well as cases which had failed. Having twenty-four countries in our pool strengthens our findings; having selected the cases crossregionally diminishes the chance that our results are biased by region; and having cases which vary by outcome allows us to identify generalizable patterns for successful and unsuccessful democratization attempts.

Finally, we have contextual depth. From January 1993 to August 1995, the authors, along with four graduate assistants and two undergraduate assistants, coded and double-checked country information collected from numerous works written by experts on our cases. We used this information to construct case histories which detail each country's experience through the regime choice process as it unfolded. (The transition case histories for each country were approximately fifteen pages long and were based on at least ten sources written by country experts. The postinstallation case histories for each case which successfully arrived at democracy, discussed in chapter 8, were around ten pages long and used at least five sources.) As a result, our study has the advantages of both the "small N" and "large N" approaches. Because of our detailed case histories, we have collected contextual data with which we can identify generalizable patterns for each of our three outcomes. But in addition, the large number of cases in our pool, selected crossregionally, increases the reliability of our findings. The rest of this chapter describes in detail how we set up our study.

## SELECTING CASES AND BUILDING CASE HISTORIES

As we mentioned above, this book seeks to answer two questions: why does a country install democracy after authoritarian rule; and why does a new democracy progress toward consolidation? Based on these questions, we identified a pool of countries which had experienced a transition phase. To answer the first question, we needed cases which had successfully installed democracy, as well as cases which had failed. To answer the second question, we needed not only cases which had installed democracy, but also cases in which the new democracy showed evidence of consolidating. Furthermore, we wanted the number of cases per outcome (i.e., continued authoritarianism, democratic installation, and consolidating democracy) to be roughly equal.

Because we are concerned with when competing actors would choose a democracy as the next type of government, our case selection has two

## Setting Up Our Study

### INTRODUCTION

As we discussed in chapter 1, this book addresses two questions: First, why do some countries install democracy after a crisis threatens to end authoritarian rule, while others see a continuation of authoritarianism? Second, why do some of these new democracies progress toward consolidation, while others either stall or collapse? This volume, then, considers the three possible outcomes of the regime choice process: continued authoritarianism, democratic installation, and consolidating democracy. It shows that there are distinct paths for each of these outcomes, and identifies the paths by following actors' negotiations across the process.

We designed our study to insure that the analysis would be conducted systematically, the findings would be generalizable to a broad range of countries, and the discussion of our cases would be rich in contextual detail. The regime choice process we presented in chapter 2 offers us the ability to make structured comparisons. It allows us to identify which actors were involved in the transition negotiations, which outcomes they preferred, which actor the Mass Public supported, and which strategy the authoritarian regime used in the negotiations across all twenty-four cases. By focusing on the regime choice process as it unfolds in each country, then, we can make sense in a systematic way of the different transition experiences in a large number of cases.

This study has the further advantage of following a large number of cases covering a wide geographical area. We selected six cases from each of

additional criteria. First, democracy had to be a preference (although not necessarily the first preference) for at least one of the competing actors that took part in the Deal Cutting Stage of the transition phase. We added this criterion because if no actor prefers democracy, then the chance of it being selected as the outcome is low. In other words, democracy had to be a possible outcome in order for the case to be selected.

Second, the countries had to have entered the Deal Cutting Stage, because we are interested in the bargaining between competing groups. Thus, in order for the country to be included in our pool of cases, the competing actors must have agreed to negotiate with each other. Furthermore, democracy cannot have been directly installed by conquering powers or external actors. In other words, countries such as Japan, Italy, Germany, and Panama would not qualify. This decision rule is related to the previous one, in that we are looking at cases where the competing actors themselves negotiated the form of the next government, and agreed to its installation.

Our cases of regime change occurred between 1973 and 1993. This time period allows us to use Freedom House as a systematic source for determining the outcome of the process, since the organization began releasing its data in 1973. However, this period is also theoretically appropriate in that it roughly corresponds to the "third wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991, 16; Schmitter and Karl 1991, 75; Weffort 1993, 245). We selected cases to represent a wide range of geographical areas, to increase the generalizability of our findings and to insure that our findings were not due to spurious local trends. Thus, our cases consist of six countries from each of four regions—Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Southern and Eastern Europe. Finally, we selected the cases so that, as much as possible, each region is represented across the range of outcomes. In other words, we did not want all of the cases from one region to result in authoritarian regimes, or consolidating democracies. (In addition to these criteria to answer our research questions, we also used two general rules for case selection: a case must have a population over one million people, and must have been created prior to 1990. The reason for these rules was to insure that there would be enough information available on our countries to allow us to reconstruct the transition process.)

Implementing the above case selection rules, we identified the twenty-four countries that make up our pool: eight in which the outcome of the transition process is authoritarianism, seven in which the result is the installation of democracy, and nine where the outcome is a democracy making progress toward consolidation. Our cases, then, are: Afghanistan (1973), Angola (1992), Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1978), Brazil (1984), Chile (1989),

Greece (1974), Honduras (1981), Hungary (1990), Iran (1979), Kenya (1978), Liberia (1985), Myanmar (1990), Nigeria (1979), the Philippines (1986), Poland (1989), Portugal (1976), Romania (1990), South Korea (1987), Spain (1977), Sudan (1986), Turkey (1983), Uganda (1980), and Uruguay (1984). Of the twenty-nine "third wave" cases of successful transition to democracy (Huntington 1991, 113), our pool of countries includes approximately half; and we have captured at least half of the cases which made it to the Deal Cutting Stage but ended in continued authoritarianism.

Once we had selected our cases and identified our factors, we then created a structured case history for each country, to gain a "structured, focused comparison" (George and McKeown 1985, 41; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 45). The case history follows the regime choice process as it unfolded in each of our countries, from the critical juncture to the installation of a new regime (whether authoritarian or democratic). It documents the behavior of the actors (the Defender in particular) as well as the Mass Public across the transition phase, as they identify themselves, negotiate with each other, and send and receive cues. (The resulting information regarding the three factors in our twenty-four cases is presented in Appendix A.)

In constructing the case histories we used Banks (1991) as a systematic source of events data. However, we relied primarily on the work of country specialists, to increase both the accuracy of our information and the richness of our contextual data. We started by constructing the histories of those countries in which one or the other of us had done fieldwork (see Casper 1995; Taylor forthcoming), as we felt our personal experience would enhance our ability to identify and collect the relevant materials. We then used these histories as templates for the other cases, in the sense that they helped

Table 3.1 Cases and Outcomes of the Transition Process

<i>Consolidating democracy</i>	<i>Democratic installation</i>	<i>Continued authoritarianism</i>
Argentina	Brazil	Afghanistan
Chile	Honduras	Angola
Greece	Nigeria	Bolivia
Hungary	Philippines	Iran
Poland	Sudan	Kenya
Portugal	Turkey	Liberia
South Korea	Uganda	Myanmar
Spain		Romania
Uruguay		

Sources: "Survey," 1988:54-65; "Comparative Measures of Freedom," 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992; *Freedom in the World* 1984, 1993, 1994.

us to identify exactly the type and amount of material we would need to produce a credible case history for each of the remaining twenty-two cases.

Ideally, we would have been experts on each of our twenty-four cases, and would have conducted fieldwork in each of the countries. Had our study comprised only a few cases, this would have been more feasible. And if we were explaining the transition phase in any one country, we would probably have used the fieldwork approach. However, the focus of our study is on identifying similar patterns across a large number of cases. As a result, the cost in time and money of such extensive fieldwork was prohibitive, and we decided that relying on systematic data in addition to numerous secondary sources offered a strong alternative.<sup>1</sup>

### CODING OUTCOMES AND FACTORS

The regime choice process has three possible outcomes: Actors' negotiations during the transition phase could result in the installation of another authoritarian regime, led either by the Defender or by another authoritarian actor. Alternatively, a democracy could be installed. Finally, the result could be a democracy which is making progress toward consolidation.

The outcome of the transition phase is influenced by several factors, as we discussed in chapter 1. However, we will focus on the role of three factors specific to the regime choice process: the nature of the preferences of the Defender and Challenger, the Defender's response to cues regarding which actor the Mass Public supports (and thus which outcome the Mass Public prefers), and the Defender's strategy for the negotiations. We selected preferences, cues, and strategies because they capture the essence of negotiating a transition toward democracy. Preferences identify what the competing actors want, and indicate whether or not there is common ground, which affects the ease of the negotiations and the likelihood of compromise. Cues show whether there is mass support for either actor's proposals. These cues, and the Defender's responses to them, influence the actors' assessments of their chances of achieving their most preferred outcome for the transition. Choice of strategy shows an actor's assessment of its relative bargaining position: actors willing to concede usually have assessed their position as weaker, and those who press their own agenda usually believe they hold the stronger position. As part of its strategy the Defender can attempt to impose rules to constrain the negotiations; if successful, this tactic will give the Defender certain advantages during the transition.

Each of these three factors—actors' preferences, the Defender's response to Mass Public cues, and the Defender's strategy—affects the out-

come of the democratization process. They also interact to determine the "path" the process follows, leading to three possible outcomes. For example, the Defender may, early in the transition phase, be able to impose rules that constrain the negotiations. However, as the process unfolds and its lack of popular support is made clear the Defender may reassess its chances of obtaining its most preferred outcome, and make concessions to its opponent. Alternatively, the nature of actors' preferences and the inflexibility of all players in pressing for their most preferred outcome may make compromise seem unlikely. The process may end up following a very different path, however, if the Defender, facing staunch and escalating popular opposition, finds it cannot impose constraining rules, and the democratic opposition is thus empowered to press for a democratic outcome. In chapters 4 to 6, therefore, we first look at each factor on its own to establish a clear understanding of its role in the process. Then we consider the interactive nature of the three factors—how they work together to lead a country down a path to continued authoritarianism, democratic installation, or consolidating democracy.

### The Outcome of the Regime Choice Process

The regime choice process can result in continued authoritarianism, democratic installation, or a consolidating democracy. An authoritarian regime is characterized by "limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (Linz 1964, 297). In other words, such a regime constricts the ability of the Mass Public to participate, while offering rulers relatively unrestricted power.

Democracy, on the other hand, is "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office" (Lipset 1963, 27). Thus, democracy differs from authoritarianism in that the Mass Public can participate and the rulers' powers are based on maintaining mass support.

Because we are focusing on countries that negotiate to install a new government after a period of authoritarianism, we realize that countries may install a democratic government that is flawed. This is particularly common where concessions have been made to the authoritarian regime to induce it

to step down. For example, elected officials may discover that their policies are "subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials" (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 81), or that elections are biased (Valenzuela 1992, 66–67). The difference between democracy and authoritarianism is not always clear-cut. Many authoritarian regimes incorporate elements of democracy to legitimize themselves, while many new democracies retain vestiges of authoritarianism. We pay particular attention to the difficult question of determining whether a given country is democratic. To determine whether a new democracy is making progress toward consolidation, we look at whether or not they introduce and strengthen democratic elements while also pruning out nondemocratic ones.

To code the outcomes of our cases, we used both information from country experts and Freedom House's country rankings. In general, we turned to the country specialists for expert opinions regarding the outcome of the regime choice process. Then we compared their conclusions with the Freedom House rankings. If there was a serious discrepancy between the two sources, or if the cases fell in the margin according to Freedom House's categories, then we overruled Freedom House's rankings and followed the country experts.

We used Freedom House rankings as a systematic source to identify the outcomes of our twenty-four cases.<sup>2</sup> Since 1973, Freedom House has scored countries annually across two categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights

enable people to participate freely in the political process. By the political process, we mean the system by which the polity chooses the authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional or local community. In a free society this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. A system is genuinely free or democratic to the extent that the people have a choice in determining the nature of the system and its leaders. (*Freedom in the World* 1991, 49)

The checklist used to rate countries' political rights entails five general questions, including such items as free and fair election of political leaders, the supremacy of elected officials over nonelected actors, and the freedom to organize political parties. Civil liberties are simply defined as "the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state" (*Freedom in the World* 1991, 50). The checklist for civil liberties in-

cludes eight general questions, such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, equality under the law, and protection from torture.

The rankings for political rights and civil liberties range from 1 to 7, with 1 being free and 7 not free. We summed the political rights and civil liberties scores to arrive at an overall score which can range from 2 to 14. We then coded countries as Free if their scores range from 2 to 4; Partly Free if they score between 5 and 10; and Not Free if they range from 11 to 14. (Freedom House breaks the codes into three categories: free [2–5], partly free [6–11], and not free [11–14] [*Freedom in the World* 1991, 51]. Appendix B includes the Freedom House ratings of our cases, beginning with the year the new regime was installed.) As the survey was designed to capture democracy (Gastil 1991, 22), we labeled the Free countries as showing evidence of making progress toward consolidation, the Partly Free countries as having installed democracy, and the Not Free countries as having installed an authoritarian regime. These results were then corroborated by crosschecking against the works of country experts.

We considered the outcome of the transition process to be an authoritarian regime if a country's score was higher than 10. The countries that fell into the continued authoritarianism category were Afghanistan, Angola, Bolivia, Iran, Kenya, Liberia, Myanmar, and Romania.

Sometimes the coding of a country's outcome as continued authoritarianism was straightforward, as in Angola, Iran, Myanmar, and Romania. However, a few cases we had to consider more closely. For example, we took into consideration the score for the following year when the transition occurred in the second half of the calendar year. Afghanistan is a case where the transition occurred in July 1973; its Freedom House score was 9 for 1973, but 13 for 1974. If a country's Freedom House score was borderline (i.e., if the country scored a 10), then we turned to country readings to determine experts' opinions regarding which type of regime the country had installed. For example, numerous authors agreed that the Moi regime, installed in Kenya in 1978, quickly showed its authoritarian face as the president increased his control over the government, and in particular over the legislature. Thus, we coded the outcome of the regime choice process in Kenya as continued authoritarianism. Our coding for Bolivia and Liberia followed a similar course; reference to country experts resulted in our coding the outcome of the regime choice process as continued authoritarianism in these two cases also.

In determining the outcome of a case, we were concerned only with explaining the outcome for the particular regime choice process we had selected for our pool. It would be possible, though, for the same country to

experience another regime choice process later on which would result in a democratic government being installed. An example of this would be Bolivia, where the regime choice process that took place in 1978 produced an authoritarian regime; its Freedom House scores later dropped to 5 due to the occurrence of another regime choice process in 1983. Thus, it is possible for our continued authoritarian cases to become democratic later, as it would be possible for the democratic installation cases eventually to collapse (as we discuss in chapter 8) or make progress toward consolidation after 1993.

We considered democratic installation to be the outcome of the regime choice process in countries that had Freedom House scores from 5 to 10, and also had corroborating evidence from country experts. Our democratic installation cases, then, are Brazil, Honduras, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda.

The cases that clearly fell between 5 and 10 and where the experts considered the new regime to be democratic, albeit flawed in some cases, are Brazil, Honduras, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sudan, and Turkey. Brazil is included in the democratic installation pool rather than the consolidating democracy pool because although it reached a score of 4, its score for 1993 was 7, and its mean score was 5. The Philippines is similar to Brazil in that it scored a 4 for one year, but its mean score was over 5. Uganda was considered a democracy because Commonwealth observers of the election stated that it was relatively clean, and this statement was backed up by the writings of country experts; furthermore, Uganda scored 10 in 1981. In general, the Freedom House scores and the country experts agreed. Where there was disagreement, we followed the opinions of the country experts.

A score of 4 or less indicated democratic installation cases that went on to show evidence of making progress toward consolidation. The cases included in this category are Argentina, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, and Uruguay.

In some cases, a country moved very quickly to this level and remained at 4 or less, as occurred in Chile, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay. In these cases, the trend was easy to identify. Argentina was considered to be showing signs of consolidating because its mean score was 4, although it scored 5 in 1992 and 1993. In South Korea, country readings argued that the dramatic reforms implemented by President Kim Young Sam in 1992 and 1993 warranted its inclusion in the consolidating pool, even though it only reached the Freedom House level of Free (4) in 1993. As we mentioned earlier, the work of country experts supported the codings of these cases. While there was some disagreement between the Freedom

House scores and country experts, these two sources were mostly in agreement for the consolidating democracy cases. Where there was disagreement, we again sided with the country experts. In the next section, we discuss the first of the three factors influencing the path a country will take through the regime choice process.

### The Nature of Actors' Preferences

An actor's "preference" concerns the type of government it wants to install: a democracy, an authoritarian regime, or something in between such as a controlled democracy under that actor's supervision. Since the transition phase involves actors competing to set up their most preferred type of government, or one as close to it as possible, the outcome will be affected by whether these preferences converge or diverge. We rate preferences as converging or diverging based on the actors' most preferred outcomes for the process at the end of the critical juncture. By this point potential actors have realized that there is an opportunity for change, and have begun to consider the range of outcomes they might support. We identify actors' preferences based on their ideal points (that is, the outcome they most desire for the regime choice process). The further a proposal is from their ideal point, the harder it will be for them to concede. In addition, an actor's ideal outcome for the process influences its negotiating strategy—obviously, it will choose the strategy it considers most likely to produce an outcome that is as close as possible to its ideal point.

Preferences can either converge or diverge. One factor that indicates whether actors' preferences are coded as converging or diverging is how many actors prefer democracy. If democracy is established, then even an actor that does not control the new government has the potential to win control in the future. Thus, with democracy no one is permanently shut out of power. However, if a controlled democracy or an authoritarian regime is installed, the chances are low that the actor on the "losing" side will gain control under the new government, barring another critical juncture that starts a new regime choice process. Because the installation of a controlled democracy or an authoritarian regime closes other actors out of power, such a preference is more conflictual than a preference for democracy, even if the actors involved prefer different types of democratic governments. Thus, conflict comes from the possibility of an actor being locked out of the decision-making mechanism.

Conflict can also be due to the magnitude of the difference between actors' ideal points. We consider a "democracy-controlled democracy" pairing as convergent because if a controlled democracy is installed, the actor