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Spring 2002 The Effects of Gender and Dependency on the Division of Household Labor By Ryland Waller '02 As women's labor force participation has increased and dual earning households have become greater in number, decisions about household labor have become increasingly important. Following in the tradition of Brines (1994) and Greestein (2000), I examine the relationship between economic dependency and housework hours to explain the gender-based inequality in the division of household labor. Using a sample of 901 dual-earning households, I find that wives' housework hours are responsive to wives' dependency among several demographic variables. On the other hand, none of the socioeconomic variables used in this study explain the housework behavior of husbands. Over the last several decades, sociologists and economists have
become increasingly interested in the division of household labor as an indicator
of patterned behavior within the family and between men and women. Unpaid household
labor has traditionally been "women's work." One would expect increased
labor force participation rates for women would shift this trend and create
a more equal division of housework. Evidence suggests that men have increased
and women have decreased their total household labor hours over the past few
decades, but women continue to do two times more housework than men (Coltrane
2000). Overall, a wife's full time employment only slightly increases her husband's
housework hours (Blumberg 1991). Clearly, women are still doing a disproportionate
amount of housework despite recent labor force changes. Four major conceptual theories have been offered to explain the
gender-based disparity in the division of labor within households (Greenstein
2000). The relative resources approach suggests an exchange occurs within the
household based on resources, like income. Blood and Wolfe's 1960 study explains
the division of labor as an economic allocation based on time and skill, and
"comparative resourcefulness." They propose that the differential
resources men and women bring to the family determine the division of labor.
These differences in resources allow for gender segregation by feminine and
masculine household tasks. Becker's (1981) theory of human capital, which falls under the
relative resources framework, suggests households maximize efficiency and output
through specialization. The spouse with the least income potential will do the
greater share of housework. He suggests that the family member with the most
human capital investment toward market work will specialize in market work and
the member with the most human capital investment toward household work will
specialize in household work, given the appropriate wages from market work and
non-market work in the home. He also notes that the sexual division of labor
is "partly due to intrinsic differences between the sexes" (p. 21),
hence biological differences, like childbearing create this division. Another perspective on the division of household labor focuses
on sex and gender role attitudes. From this view, men and women divide housework
based on learned standards of behavior. West and Zimmerman (1987) explain that
humans learn through interaction to construct and recognize gender displays
as masculine or feminine. "Doing gender" creates differences between
males and females, not as the result of biology or nature, but because of socialization.
Therefore, "it is not simply that household labor is designated as 'women's
work,' but that for a woman to engage in it and a man not to engage in it is
to draw on and exhibit the 'essential nature' of each" (p. 30). The gender
display theory suggests that husbands' and wives' gender attitudes determine
the division of household labor. The fourth perspective explaining the gender-based division of
household labor is the economic dependency model used by Brines (1994). The
dependency model, developed from the economic-exchange approach, suggests that
household labor is performed as a type of payment for economic support. Because
women are more likely to be dependent on their husbands for economic support,
housework continues to be women's work. Walby (1986) proposes this idea, explaining
the division of labor in the household as an economic transaction between an
'employer' and 'employee,' typified by the male spouse as an employer who enforces
an unwritten labor contract, distributing both labor and money. The dependency
theory is gender-neutral although expectations in society may be gender-specified
(Brines 1994). Curtis (1986) notes that the exchange of labor for economic support
is not entirely economic, but social as well. Emotions and the marriage contract
itself make exchanges within the household more complex. Women do not perform
a certain number of hours of housework in exchange for room and board, but do
so for future support in the relationship. In fact, the market value of housework
performed may be higher than the breadwinner's income (Curtis 1986). Thenotion of dependency is closely tied not only with economics,
but also with the theory of gender attitudes. Following Brines's 1994 study,
I am interested in how dependency may affect the division of housework, especially
when it come to those couples who break the standards that fix husband as breadwinner
and wife as dependent. In this situation, men and women are not displaying the
normal gender interactions prescribed by society. One would expect heavy social
consequences of such an arrangement. In fact, in Hochschild and Machung's 1989
study of dual-earning couples, men admitted feeling criticized by friends and
relatives when their wives were financially superior. Many of these couples
turn to more traditional divisions of household labor. In their study, men whose
wives are breadwinners did less housework than those whose wives made about
the same as or less income than their husbands. Furthermore, husbands did less
housework the more they depended on their wives for economic support. Thompson
and Walker (1991) claim that wives do not appear to use power from their higher
incomes to advocate a more equal distribution of housework. In fact they "report
catering to their husbands' whims and salving their egos" (88). Brines
(1994) reports that husbands who are low-income or dependent because of unemployment
are the least likely to help with housework. The above findings seem to contradict
the gender-neutral dependency theory and support the idea that housework is
performed because of learned social norms. Perhaps husbands with breadwinner
wives compensate for the loss of masculinity in the income arena by adopting
traditional gender behavior within the household. Brines (1994) finds that two different processes for husbands
and wives may explain the relationship between economic dependence and housework.
For wives, Brines discovers a negative linear relationship between the proportion
of family income earned by wives and the amount of housework they perform. However,
she suggests that a different process occurs for husbands. Brines finds that
husbands on either extreme of dependency performed the least amount of housework,
while husbands whose earnings were approximately equal to their wives' earnings
performed the most. She proposes that this curvilinear relationship supports
the gender display perspective. Greenstein (2000) obtained similar results in a replication of
Brine's (1994) study. Adding terms for gender ideology, regions of residence,
whether residence is urban, and a dummy variable for Latino background, and
using a different data set from the National Survey of Families and Households,
Greenstein found the linear dependency model holds for the wives' regressions,
and a "second-order curvilinear" relationship between economic dependency
and husbands' hours of housework in the same inverted U-shape [Brines] observed
in the PSID data" (p. 329). In an extension of the Brines (1994) study,
Greenstein performed the regressions using a distributional measure of housework-
a percentage of housework performed by husbands and wives- as the dependent
variable. The regressions using a different dependent variable yielded different
results from Brines. Instead of a linear relationship, Greenstein found a U-shaped
pattern in the effect of dependency on housework for wives, like that of husbands
except not inverted. Therefore, very dependent and very providing wives performed
more housework than wives with incomes closer to that of their husbands. Furthermore,
breadwinner wives performed more housework than the linear dependency model
would predict. Greenstein explains the curvilinear relationships between dependency
and housework as "deviance neutralization" where spouses who violate
normal gender role definitions "exaggerat[e] behaviors or appearances that
contradict the deviant identity" (p. 333). He uses this term to describe
a more general form of gender display because she finds that gender ideology
has no significant effect on the model. He suggests that husbands and wives
practice gender display regardless of their gender ideologies. I predict that more recent data may reflect significant gender attitude changes, and may contain an increased number of breadwinner wives that may influence the outcome of the study. In addition to Brines's (1994) model, I add terms for Latino background and Baptist religious preference. With regard to Greenstein's study, I will look for the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between dependency and housework for both the husbands' and wives'. Method The Dependency Theory Dependency has been commonly defined in the literature
by the following formula originally proposed by Sorenson and McLanahan (1987): Dependency = (Own Income-Spouse Income)/ (Own
Income+Spouse Income) (1) Therefore, the dependency variable ranges in values
from "1" to "-1" where "1" means that one provides
complete economic support to his or her spouse and "-1" means that
one is completely dependent on his or her spouse for economic support. The dependency theory of economic exchange proposes
a negative relationship between the amount of income one spouse contributes
to the family pool of income and the number of housework hours he or she
performs. Those who earn more income perform less housework, and vice
versa. This relationship is easy to visualize when only one spouse is
employed and the other is specializing in household production and is,
therefore, 100 percent dependent. Complete specialization becomes self-perpetuating
because each person becomes more efficient at either household or market
production. Therefore, it is within relationships of partial dependency
tied with other sociological factors and time constraints that I hope
to understand the division of housework. According to the dependency theory, as one
moves from being more dependent on one's spouse to being less dependent,
the expected hours of housework should decrease, regardless of sex. On
the other hand, for couples who break the norms of being male-breadwinner
and wife-dependent, research indicates that husbands do less housework
the more they are economically dependent on their wives (Thompson and
Walker 1991). Furthermore, Greenstein (2000) finds that as wives move
toward providership, they perform less housework to a point and then begin
to perform more housework. This idea supports the gender display theory
that women perform housework and men do not in order to display their
gender (Zimmerman and West 1981). Couples who defy the norms of gender
display in earning income may exaggerate their gender roles by turning
to a more traditional division of household labor. In this case, Figure
1 shows that as a husband moves toward greater providership, the marginal
influence of dependency on housework should be positive reaching zero
and then becoming negative. The opposite would be true for the wives'
regression- the marginal influence of dependency on housework would be
negative reaching zero and becoming positive. Note that Figure
1 assumes that the total number of housework hours remain constant.
Although this seems like a logical assumption, I will not impose this
constraint on the model. Brines (1994) observes that because men usually have
higher wage and promotion probabilities, dependent husbands are more likely
to be able to support themselves than dependent wives if the marriage were to
fail. Therefore, dependency within marriage might have a larger effect on the
amount of housework performed by wives than on the housework hours of husbands.
If this is true, I expect the wives' curve to have a steeper slope than the
husbands' curve. Empirical Model Weekly Housework = f (Dependency, Age, Hours Worked/Week,
Education, Culture) (2) For the dependent variable, I use the number of hours
spent on housework per week for both men and women. Those interviewed through
the PSID were asked approximately how much time they spent on cooking, cleaning,
and other work around the house on an average week (excluding child care). This
measure may not be as precise as data from a time-diary, but the PSID offers
reliable economic data with variables that are pertinent to my study, so it
is the data source best suited to this study. In order to evaluate the division of household labor between husbands and wives, I run separate regressions for husbands and wives using several independent variables. Measuring dependency by the formula given above, I am looking for two possible effects on the division of housework. If the dependency theory holds, I expect a negative linear relationship between dependency and housework hours. Therefore I expect:
If the gender display theory holds, I expect a curvilinear relationship between dependency and housework hours defined by:
Another variable that may affect the number of hours of housework performed by both husbands and wives is their respective ages. Age may be an indicator of ideology regarding traditional gender roles. Assuming that older adults tend to be more traditional in their expectations of gender roles, the marginal influence should be negative for the husbands' regression and positive for that of the wives. As husbands age, they are expected to perform less and less housework. I expect the marginal influence of age on housework to be negative for husbands.
On the other hand, I expect that as wives age, they perform more housework to a certain point but eventually they may level off or reduce the amount of housework they do. Therefore, I expect the marginal influence of age on housework to be positive for wives and the change in marginal influence of age on housework to be negative, creating a curved relationship.
A third variable in the model is the amount of hours worked per week in paid employment, which measures the time available for doing housework. For both men and women, a large number of hours worked per week in paid employment should reduce the amount of hours of housework performed. Hours in paid work take away hours and energy available for unpaid work. Therefore I expect the marginal influence of the hours of paid employment per week on housework for husbands and wives to be negative.
To account for educational differences, I use dummy
variables for education levels. Education level is an indicator of human capital
investment but it also can reflect lifestyles and attitudes. Studies indicate
that educated women tend to do less housework and educated men tend to do more
(Goldscheider and Waite 1991). For the regressions in this study, the base case
is a high school graduate, and the variables used in the equation are high school
dropout and college graduate. Following the above logic, in the case of the
high school dropout husband, I expect the intercept to decrease compared to
high school graduates. The intercept should increase for high school dropout
wives. Husbands who have graduated from college are expected to do more housework
than high school graduates so the intercept should be larger. College graduated
wives, however, should do less housework than wives with high school diplomas
only, so the intercept corresponding to this group should be lower. I also include
slope dummy variables for high school dropouts and college graduates. I expect
the marginal influence of husbands being a high school dropout on housework
should be negative and positive for high school dropout wives. The marginal
influence of husbands being college graduates should be positive and negative
for college graduate wives. I use three racial and cultural control variables
in this study. One dummy variable is applied for African-Americans. Other studies
have found African Americans husbands and wives to share housework more equally
and are less traditional about gender work roles than white couples (Ross 1987).
Therefore, I expect the intercept to increase and the marginal influence on
housework to be positive for African-American husbands compared to white husbands
and to decrease and have a negative marginal influence for African-American
wives compared to white wives. I also use a dummy variable to control for cultural
differences in Latinos compared to whites. Latinos tend to be culturally more
traditional about gender roles than whites (Cronkite 1977), so I expect the
intercept to decrease and marginal influence on housework to be negative for
Latino husbands compared to white husbands. The intercept should increase and
have a positive marginal influence for Latino wives compared to white wives.
Finally, I examine the effect of Baptist ideological
differences on the number of housework hours performed by husbands and wives.
In 1998, the Southern Baptist convention proclaimed that "a wife is to
submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband" (Railey
1998) and emphasized the role of women in the home. Therefore, I expect the
gender roles to be more traditional for Baptists. For Baptist husbands, the
intercept should decrease and there should be a negative marginal influence
compared to non-Baptist husbands and for Baptist wives the intercept should
increase and there should be a positive marginal influence on housework compared
to non-Baptists. This model includes several cross products of variables.
Because I am exploring the behavior of families making decisions based on complex
negotiations, it is likely that many of the above mentioned variables will interact
to affect the division of household labor. These interaction variables are simply
exploration, and I have no predictions of their affects on the marginal influence. The above variables and their slope and marginal influence implications imply that a quadratic model specification should be used for these regressions. I need my model to allow the possibility of marginal influences for the dependency variable and the age variable for wives to be positive, negative, or zero. I also expect to have second derivatives for the dependency, age, and hours of paid employment variables. The quadratic form allows for all of these expectations. The empirical model in quadratic form is the following:
(3) where H= weekly hours of housework performed, D=
Dependency variable, A= age, P= hours of paid employment per week, Hsdrop= dummy
variable for high school dropout, Coll= dummy variable for college graduate,
Black= dummy variable for African-Americans, Latino= dummy variable for Latinos,
Baptist= dummy variable for Baptists. I use several simplifications in developing the theory and transforming it into the above model. In developing the theory, I assume that husbands and wives completely and equally pool their income. This may not be true in all couples, especially those who are very wealthy, but this assumption will hold for the majority of married couples. In my sample I use only married dual-earning couples with no children in order to more closely examine decisions made between husbands and wives. Children of different ages require different amounts of housework, and childcare may be too closely associated with housework in estimates of housework hours. In addition, I only use dual-earning couples to eliminate retired couples, and those who have chosen to have one spouse completely specialize in household production as I am more interested in how couples split up this "second shift" of housework than how it is split when housework is considered the main job of one spouse. I also eliminate cohabiting couples, because I think those who are making decisions under a contract of marriage act differently from those who are only cohabiting, and I want to isolate those who are bound in a contract of marriage. Thereby, I am also eliminating homosexual couples, because I am interested in exchange of men and women and how dependency and gender display may interact. Finally, I do not control for those who hire help to do their housework or the possibility of investing in tools that help one to do housework more efficiently, like a dishwasher. Glenna Spitze (1999) finds that fewer than 2 percent of married couple households have formal or informal outside help, so the couples with hired help are small enough in number not to affect my regressions significantly. In addition, most tools used to lessen housework are inexpensive enough that they are available to all. More expensive tools used to reduce housework are most likely owned by those who can afford them: either those couples with one high-income spouse specializing in market work or those with both spouses in high income market work. Because these two descriptions describe the situational range of my sample, the presence of household tools is not likely to affect the outcomes of my study. Results Descriptive Statistics Table 1 presents the
means and standard deviations of the sample data. 901 marriages are represented
in this study. The husbands' average age was 43 years old while the wives'
average age was about 2.5 years younger. Wives on average earned about
20 percent of the total family income and worked an average of 37.96 hours
of paid employment per week, while husbands worked an average of 45.77
hours of paid employment per week. On average, wives performed 14.7 hours
of housework per week while husbands performed 6.8 hours per week. These
differences in age, dependency, hours worked per week and housework are
statistically significant when examining husbands and wives as matched
pairs. Furthermore, approximately 19.36% of couples perform amounts of
housework that are statistically equal. Table 2 presents the regression
results that are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the square of
age as the target variable. The model as a whole has explanatory power. Table 3 presents the
estimated marginal influences at the average for the husbands' and wives'
regressions. All marginal influences have the expected signs in the wives'
regression. However, in the husbands' regression, several variables have
surprising signs. For example, high school dropout husbands appear to
do more housework than high school graduates while college graduate husbands
do less than high school graduates. While I did not expect this result,
similar results have been found in some case studies. Although more educated
men may tend to be more egalitarian with respect to housework, Hochschild
(1989) found that many men who call themselves "egalitarian"
share housework less than those who label themselves as more traditional. Overall, none of the variables tested affect the
amount of housework husbands are performing. One explanation for this finding
is based on Chodorow's work. She explains, "A boy, in his attempt to gain
an elusive masculine identification, often comes to define this masculinity
largely in negative terms, as that which is not feminine or involved with women"
(p. 86). She suggests that husbands assert their masculinity by avoiding housework,
or only doing the amount of housework that is socially appropriate for men to
do. That no variables affect the housework hours of men supports the idea that
there is an appropriate amount of housework men are expected to do. Husbands
will continue to do the same amount of work when they are completely providing
for their family, but they are unwilling to change their behavior when their
wives are providing the majority of family income. On the other hand, many of the variables affect the
wives' housework hours. In the wives' regression the marginal influence of dependency
on housework is statistically significant and negative when calculated while
the second derivative is positive. Graph 1 shows the effect of dependency on
housework hours using the regression results. While no variables tested change
the number of housework hours husbands perform, wives appear to do more housework
when they are very dependent, reducing housework hours to a point close to where
they have almost equal incomes, and then increasing housework hours as they
provide more of the family income. The marginal influence is negative not because
the curve has a negative slope but because the average wife's dependency is
0.2045 where the curve still has yet to reach its minimum point. The minimum
point on the curve occurs when dependency equals 0.3264. In addition, a wife's age and the number of hours
she spends in market work affect the amount of housework she performs. As age
increases, the amounts of housework wives perform increases. The second derivative
is statistically insignificant so the curved relationship described in the theory
is not supported by the data. The marginal influence of hours worked in paid
employment per week is negative and significant for wives. As with the age variable,
the second derivative of the employment hours variable is statistically insignificant,
which suggests a linear relationship rather than diminishing returns. The high school dropout and Baptist dummy variables
also have significant marginal influence on the amount of housework women do.
For wives, being a high school dropout has a positive marginal influence on
the amount of housework performed. In addition, wives who are Baptists do more
housework than wives who are non-Baptists. Despite the statistical significance of four of the five Latino coefficients in the husbands' regression (see Table 2), the hypothesis test for the marginal influence suggests there is no effect of being Latino on the amount of housework husbands perform. I predicted that Latino husbands would do less housework than non-Latinos because they usually are more traditional when determining gender roles (Cronkite 1977). However, the Latino intercept dummy variable coefficient in the husbands' regression is a significant 12.3329, which suggests that Latino husbands actually do more housework than non-Latino husbands. In addition, the marginal influence of being Latino on husbands' housework equals 1.094. Although the marginal influence is statistically insignificant, its sign is a surprising result. Hochschild (1989) found a similar outcome in her case studies. She found that traditional couples often shared the housework more equally than more modern couples because of time and financial constraints. Having established that housework was primarily women's work, traditional men actually did slightly more housework than less traditional men. Perhaps this occurs because a husband's masculinity is less threatened when he helps his wife around the house only because she needs the help and not because it is expected of him. Discussion and Conclusions The results of my regression suggest that
no factors tested here significantly affect the amounts of housework husbands
perform. On the other hand, many factors affect how many hours of housework
wives are doing. Figure 2 depicts a U-shaped relationship
between dependency and housework, which supports the gender display theory.
Age and housework hours have a positive linear relationship, which may
reflect differences in ideology about appropriate gender roles. Hours
worked in paid employment per week negatively affects the amounts of housework
wives perform. Finally, high school dropout wives and Baptist wives perform
more housework than high school graduates or non-Baptist wives. Both of
these findings support the expectations. At the beginning of this paper I laid out expectations
for the empirical results based on results in prior economic literature with
specific attention to Brines's (1994) findings. Brines found a negative linear
relationship between dependency and housework for wives and a curvilinear relationship
for husbands. Replicating Brines's study and using a distributional measure
of housework, Greenstein (2000) found curvilinear relationships for both husbands
and wives where the curve is concave up for wives and concave down for husbands.
I found no relationship between dependency and housework for husbands and a
curvilinear relationship for wives. Similar to Brines, I found that men and
women respond differently to issues of dependency, but my results do not support
the dependency theory. Rather, like Greenstein I find that breadwinner wives
perform more housework than would be expected under the economic dependency
theory. Women who earn most of the family income do not achieve a more equal
distribution of housework, but appear to take on more housework themselves.
While breadwinner wives have economic power outside of the home, they exaggerate
their femininity inside the home by doing more housework than they would if
their income were equal to their husbands'. In this study, I examine how relative earnings affect decision making within the household with regard to housework. Coverman (1983), Hersch (1991), and (Noonan 2001) find that hours spent in housework negatively affect the earnings of women. Perhaps women are less available, less ambitious or apply less effort on the job because of the amount of housework they are expected to perform at home. These combined results point to the possibility of endogeneity between the household and the labor market. For further study, this causal relationship should be examined to better understand how these decisions about the division of housework are made. References Becker, G. (1981). A treatise on the family. Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press. Berk, S.F. (1985). The gender factory: The apportionment
of work in American households. New York: Plenum. Blood, R & Wolfe,D. (1960). Husbands and wives:
The dynamics of married living. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. Blumberg, R.L. (1991). "The 'triple overlap'
of gender stratification, economy, and the family." In Blumberg, R.L. (Ed.),
Gender, family, and economy: The triple overlap. Newbury Park, Ca: Sage.
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the division of labor at home. American Journal of Sociology, 100 (3),
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personality. In Rosaldo, M. and Lamphere, L. (Eds.) Women, culture, and society.
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Appendix
Table 2. Estimation of Regression Coefficients Predicting Weekly Housework Hours (N=901)
Figure 1. The effect of dependency on housework hours: The gender display model (Brines, 1994).
Figure 2. The Effect of dependency on weekly housework hours for husbands (H) and wives (W). A lesser dependency value signifies greater economic dependence on one's spouse while a larger dependency value signifies greater economic providership.
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