• Ph.D. Oxford University
  • M.A. Brandeis University
  • B.A. University of Chicago


I specialize in modern philosophy and philosophy of mind. I work on problems of the mind that emerged in the early modern period and remain with us today.

Currently I’m writing on the conditions of non-empirical mental representation: how empiricists in the Humean mold must explain the possibility of thought with non-sensory content, and how Kantians must explain the possibility of a priori thought about empirical objects.

My next project is an application of Kant’s metaphysics to three broader problems of the mind: phenomenal consciousness, inductive justification, and freedom.

A running theme in my work is adjudicating between empiricist and transcendental idealist theories of mind. My longer-term ambition is a monograph on the subject.

At Davidson, I teach introductory philosophy, early modern philosophy, Kant, philosophy of mind, and informal logic. I also teach in the Writing Program.